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II. ARGUMENT lN REPLY
A. Mr. Newman's Claim of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel was Raised
Before the District Court and is Properly Before this Court

The state argues that the claim that Mr. Newman's state and federal constitutional rights
to effective assistance of counsel were violated by counsel's deficiencies, which resulted in the
presentation of an absurd defense, was not raised in his post-conviction petition before the
District Court, referencing the petition, amended petition and affidavits. From this, the state
concludes that appellate review is precluded. Respondent's Brief page 8-10. However, the
state's argument is unsustainable for at least three reasons: I) the claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel in multiple deficiencies, resulting in the presentation of a defense contrary to the facts,
was raised in the initial petition; 2) even if the state's argument that the claim was not raised in
the petition is accepted, the claim was tried before the District Court by consent of the parties, as
is allowed by the court rules and case law; and 3) separate errors by counsel are not separate
claims of ineffective assistance, but rather different aspects of a single claim and are to be
analyzed for their cumulative effect upon the right to counsel, and there can be no argument
against the fact that the initial and amended petitions raise a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel.

I. The Claim of Ine_ffective Assistance of Counsel was Raised in
the Initial Petition
Jn his initial petition, Mr. Newman claimed that Van Bishop had provided
constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel. Ile specifically cited eight deficiencies of
counsel. R 8-10 (paragraph 7, subsections a - h). Of course. the prejudice from these
deficiencies was that together, they resulted in the presentation of a defense completely

inconsistent with the facts and evidence. And, in his aflidavit in support of the petition. Mr.
Newman set out factual information to support this argument specifically noting that counsel's
ineffectiveness lay in presenting a defense that was contrary to the facts as known to Mr.
Newman and provable by the state. Mr. Newman specifically averred that he had not sexually
assaulted Ms. C, that he had not urinated in the sink, that

had told Mr. Bishop that he was not

the only person involved in the crimes, that he could demonstrate a timeline which would show
that he could not have committed the charged offenses alone, and that the lack of Ms. C's DNA
on his hands would be probative of his lack of involvement in the sexual assault. R 30-32. Mr.
Newman repeatedly stated that had Mr. Bishop not been ineffective in failing to present a defense
consistent with the fact that he was present, but not guilty of the kidnaping, robbery and battery,
then the jury would not have convicted him of all the charged offenses: "Had Van Bishop
followed up on this forensic evidence, the jury would have found me not guilty of the crimes
related to sexual assault because the urine in the sink was not mine." R 30. "Had the jury heard
this testimony they would have had a reasonable doubt about whether I committed all of the
crimes with which I was charged." R 31. "Had the jury learned that the test results were
negative for the victim's DNA, it would have raised reasonable doubts about whether I sexually
assaulted the victim." R 31. "With evidence to refute the State's timeline, such as witnesses
(sic) testimony from other people directly and collaterally involved, the jury would have had
reasonable doubt about the State's version of events." R 32. "Had Van Bishop met with me, and
subpoenaed the witnesses to refute the State's timeline and provide DNA evidence which
provide (sic) my innocence, the jury would have had reasonable doubt about my guilt." R 32.
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/\n application for post-conviction relief differs from a complaint in an ordinary civil
action, requiring more than a short and plain statement of the claim that would suffice for a
complaint under I.R.C.P. 8(a)( 1). I.C. § 19-4903; Small v. State, 132 Idaho 327, 331, 971 P.2d
1151, 1155 (Ct. App. 1998). Rather, the application must be verified with respect to facts within
the personal knowledge of the applicant, and affidavit, records, or other supporting evidence
must be attached or the application must state why such supporting evidence is not included. Id
However, there is no requirement that the application contain not only all the claims but every
argument to be presented in support of the claims.
In this case, Mr. Newman's petition raised the claim that counsel was ineffective and
cited specific deficiencies. A.nd, his affidavit set forth the factual averments to support his
argument that the deficiencies were prejudicial because they resulted in the presentation of an
absurd defense. While his counsel later flushed out the arguments in support of his claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel setting forth more fully the absurdity of the defense presented in
the face of all facts and evidence to the contrary, Mr. Newman's petition and supporting
affidavits clearly raised the claim that he had received constitutionally deficient assistance of
counsel, which resulted in counsel presenting a defense inconsistent with the facts and evidence.
Thus, the state's argument in this appeal that the claim of ineffective assistance was not raised in
the petition below is factually incorrect and should be rejected.
2. In the Alternative, the Claim of Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel in Presenting a Defense Inconsistent with the Evidence
and Facts was Tried by Consent of the Parties
In the alternative, even if the state's argument that the claim of ineffective assistance was
not raised in the petition is accepted, the claim was tried by consent of the parties as is allowed

3

by the Civil Rules and case law.
Generally, post-conviction applications are governed by the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure. Cole v. State, 135 Idaho 107, 110, 15 P.3d 820,823 (2000). Idaho
Rule of Civil Procedure 15(b) provides in part, ' [w]hen issues not raised by the
pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties. they shall be
treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings.' 'The purpose of
Rule 15(b) is to allow cases to be decided on the merits, rather than upon technical
pleading requirements.' Noble v. Ada County Elections Bd., 135 Idaho 495, 500,
20 P.3d 679, 684 (2000). 'Implied consent to the trial of an unpleaded issue is not
established merely because evidence relevant to that issue was introduced without
objection. At least it must appear that the parties understood the evidence to be
aimed at the unpleaded issue.' MK. Transport, Inc. v. Grover, 101 Idaho 345,
349, 612 P.2d 1192, 1196 (1980). The trial court has the discretion to determine
whether the parties have consented to the trial on the unpled issue. Doyle v.
Ortega, 125 Idaho 458,461,872 P.2d 721, 724 (1994). '[W]hen a theory is fully
tried by the parties, I.R.C.P. 15(b) allows a court to base its decision on a theory
not pleaded "and deem the pleadings amended accordingly[.]"' Paterson v. State,
128 Idaho 494,502,915 P.2d 724, 732 (1996).

Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 57, 106 P.3d 376, 383 (2004).
While a motion to amend the pleadings, a clear ruling by the district court, and/or a
motion to alter or amend the judgment under I.R.C.P. 59( e) are useful in determining whether an
issue was tried by consent of the parties, these are not requirements and the appellate court looks
to the full record to determine whether a claim was tried by consent of the parties. See Dunlap,
141 Idaho at 58, 106 P.3d at 384. It is only required that "the parties understood the evidence to
be aimed at the unpled issue." Dunlap, 141 Idaho at 57, 106 P.3d at 383.
In this case, as set out above, the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, which
resulted in prejudice because it resulted in the presentation of an absurd defense, was clearly
raised in Mr. Newman's petition, supporting affidavits, and amended petition. However, even if
it had not been so raised, the claim was heard by consent of the parties.
Evidence was presented to support the conclusion that counsel's deficiencies resulted in
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prejudice insofar as they led to presentation of an absurd defense in Mr. Newman's affidavit filed
in response to the District Court's notice of intent to dismiss. R 20; R 29-35. The District Court
had found that even if Mr. Newman's factual allegations in his petition were true, he had failed to
establish a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's inadequi.lte performance, the outcome of
the proceeding would have been different. R 20. In response, Mr. Newman filed his affidavit
which set out that but for counsel's deficiencies, counsel would not have presented a defense
inconsistent with the facts and evidence and the case would have either been settled by a plea
agreement, with Mr. Newman pleading guilty to burglary and theft, but not to kidnaping,
robbery, and battery, or the case would have proceeded to trial wherein it was reasonably
probable that the jury would have a reasonable doubt about his guilt of the offenses he did not
commit. R 29-35.
While the state responded to Mr. Newman's affidavit with a motion for dismissal under
I.C. § l 9-4906(b ), the state did not object to the affidavit or argue that the affidavit should be
struck or ignored because it addressed claims not previously raised. Rather, the state met the
affidavit head on, arguing that it was internally inconsistent, conclusory, and did not identify
witnesses or admissible evidence to address the Court's notice of intent to dismiss. R 43-47. See
also, Tr. 5/9/06, p. 1, In. 20-24, wherein the prosecutor specifically stated, "You'll notice that I'm
not asking to strike Mr. Newman's affidavit."
And, after Mr. Newman's counsel argued to the Court that the prejudice in Mr. Bishop's
deficient performance was the fact that had counsel presented a defense consistent with the facts
and evidence, the jury would have had a reasorn.1 ble doubt as to some of the charges, Tr. 5/9/06,
p. 9, In. 5 - p. 14, In. 15, the state did not argue that a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
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wherein the prej udicc resulted from presentation of an absurd defense was not raised. Rather. the
contradictory theories - that he was both guilty

state argued that Mr. Newman was trying to

and not guilty and that a jury "would not buy that in a minute." Tr. 5/9/06, p. 14, In. 18 - p. 16,
In. 1. This response demonstrates the claim of deficient performance resulting in presentation of
a pre:iudiciaL absurd defense was tried by consent of the parties. Dunlap, supra.
Further demonstration of the state's belief that, either the claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel resulting in prejudice from the presentation of a defense inconsistent with the facts
and evidence was raised in the pleadings, or at any rate was being heard by consent of the parties,
was in Mr. Newman's reply to the notice of intent to dismiss and the state's response thereto. In
his reply, Mr. Newman made the following argument:
The prejudice resulting from trial counsel's deficient performance is the failure to
investigate and develop facts in support of Mr. Newman's defense that some one
else committed the crimes against Ms. [C]. Trial counsel pursued a theory of
complete exoneration either without a cursory review of the State's Discovery
Disclosures, or if reviewed, without recognizing no fingernail evidence was
collected by the State for DNA testing, and failing to obtain admissible evidence
to support his trial the01y. By doing so, trial counsel foreclosed investigation of
any alternative theory and essentially placed Mr. Newman in a position of' all or
nothing' with respect to Counts II, III and VI. Had counsel reviewed the
discovery disclosures, he would have found that none of the State's disclosures
included evidence taken from Mr. Newman's fingernails. Affidavit of Teresa A.
Hampton, Attachment
Rather than present a defense that was not supported by
the evidence, trial counsel should have investigated the individuals Mr. Newman
stated were present at the burglary and compel the DNA results from the
fingernail evidence or demand independent testing of the evidence. There is a
reasonable probability that but for counsel's errors the result would have been
different. R 123.
The state did not respond to this argument by asserting that a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, wherein the pr(:judice was the presentation of a defense inconsistent with
the facts and evidence, was not raised in the petition. Rather, the state argued there was no
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prejudice, because, given Mr. Newman's admission that he was at the house and was involved in
the burglary and theft, he was an aider and abettor in the remaining offenses and the convictions
would still have been proper. Tr. 2/20/08, p. 13, ln. 20 - p. 14, ln. 9.
And, then

in that same hearing, in response, Mr. I\ewman argued

talking

about the prejudice that results in selecting a theory of the case without understanding the facts of
the case." Tr. 2/20/08, p.

ln. 3-5.

When asked for a response to this argument, the state did not respond that the claim of
ineffective assistance was not before the District Court or that it was not consenting to the trial of
that claim. Rather, the state said it had no further response. Tr. 2/20/08, p.

, ln. 11-15.

At the hearing for an oral ruling on the notice of intent to dismiss, again, Mr. Newman
stated, " ... the more probable result here is [Bishop] relied upon evidence that did not exist and
developed the entire trial strategy on that. That would be objectively unreasonable under the

Strickland standard." Tr. 4/21/08, p. 35, In. 21-25. And, again, the state did not object that the
claim of deficient performance resulting in prejudice through the presentation of a defense
inconsistent with the facts and evidence was not raised in the pleadings. Tr. 4/21/08, p. 36.
The next time reference was made to the claim of deficient performance resulting in the
prejudice through the presentation of a defense inconsistent with the facts and evidence was at
the hearing on the motion for DNA testing. "So proceeding with a defense that Newman was not
present is patently absurd in light of the facts that the State was clearly going to present at the
time of trial." Tr. 9/1/10, p. 112, In. 1-4. Again, the state not only did not object on the grounds
that the absurd defense claim was not in the pleadings, but rather, argued that Mr. Newman could
not prove up this claim even with DNA testing because there was no evidence that he ever told

7

Mr. Bishop who the other person in the house was, or that he could match any DNA to that
person now. Tr. 9/1/10, p. 116, ln. 3-9.
Then, at the hearing on the state's motion for summary dismissal, Mr. Newman's counsel
yet again argued:
... I would reiterate that argument here today, that the only plausible defense
would be for him to come forward, admit culpability with respect to the burglary
and the grand thefts, testify at trial with respect to the extent of his involvement
and where critical, where he was not involved in this matter, which was the
incident involved in the bathroom with [Ms. CJ.
And that's it in a nutshell, Judge. That's our position as to why a new trial should
be granted in this matter. ...
Tr. 9/16/10, p. 136, ln. 8-14.
And, yet again the state did not object or argue that the claim had not been raised in the
pleadings. Rather the state argued that counsel was not deficient in determining to put on the
defense he chose:
So I don't think his decision, assuming his client told him that they could go
another route would be an unreasonable one, particularly where, had the jury had a
reasonable doubt raised, then it would have resulted in him being exculpated on
all of the charges as opposed to just some. His defense that he was there with
someone else would have been contrary to Ms. [C]'s testimony as well. And I just
don't see the choice as being an unreasonable one between those two choices.
Tr. 9/16/10, p. 13 8, ln. 3-10.
Even if the state's argument that the claim was not raised in the pleadings is accepted, the
matter was clearly before the District Court and heard by consent of the parties. Dunlap, supra.
And, therefore, error in the summary dismissal of the claim may be argued before this Court.
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3. In the Second Alternative, Separate Errors by Counsel are not
Separate Claims, but Rather D(fferent Aspects of a Single Claim of
Ineffective Assistance
The state's argument that the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, wherein deficient
performance resulted in presentation of an absurd defense, is not preserved for appeal should be
rejected for the reasons set forth above. In addition, the argument should be rejected because
separate errors by counsel are different aspects of a single claim of ineffective assistance and
should be analyzed together to determine the cumulative effect upon Mr. Newman's state and
federal constitutional rights to effective assistance. Sanders v. Ryder, 342 F.3d 991, 1001 (9 th
Cir. 2003).
As explained in Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325, 1333 (9 th Cir. 1978), if counsel is
charged with multiple errors, absence of prejudice is not established by simply demonstrating
that no single error considered alone significantly impaired the defense. "Prejudice may result
from the cumulative impact of multiple deficiencies." Woods v. Sinclair, 655 F.3d 886, 915 (9 th
Cir. 2011 ). See also, Lang v. Cullen, 725 F .Supp.2d 925, 970-1 (C.D. Cal. 2010), noting that
each of the claims must be analyzed separately to determine whether counsel was deficient, but
that prejudice may result from the cumulative impact of multiple deficiencies. "[T]he proper
course ... is to consider each of petitioner's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel separately
for purposes of determining whether trial counsel's conduct fell below the appropriate standard
of care, and then consider the areas of deficient performance cumulatively to determine whether
they prejudiced petitioner." 725 F.Supp.2d at 971.
In this case, in arguing that Mr. Newman's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was
not raised in the petition, the state is arguing that in cases such as Mr. Newman's wherein
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multiple deficiencies of counsel are present, that each deficiency must be considered individually
as a separate claim.
Such a standard violates the Sixth Amendment and Idaho Constitution Art. 1, Section 13.
A criminal defendant is entitled to effective assistance of counsel. An individual deficiency by
counsel standing alone may not have resulted in prejudice insofar as the single error by counsel
did not result in a reasonable probability that, but for the single error, the outcome of the trial
would have been different. See Strickland v. Wash;ngton, 446 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052,
2070 (1984 ). However, effective representation consists of multiple decisions and actions and
multiple deficiencies may together result in prejudice and the prejudice analysis must be a
cumulative analysis. Strickland, supra; Sanders, supra; Cooper, supra.
For this reason also, the state's argument that the claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, resulting from multiple deficiencies which together resulted in the presentation of an
absurd defense, was not preserved for appeal, should be rejected.
B. Summary Dismissal was Improper as the Petition Raised a Genuine Issue of
Material Fact
The arguments in support of reversal of the order of summary dismissal are set out in Mr.
Newman's Opening Brief at pages 13-19.
The District Court found that Mr. Newman had raised a material issue of fact as to
whether counsel's performance was deficient. "While Newman has raised sufficient issues of
fact relating to the first prong of the Strickland standard, the alleged deficient performance of
trial counsel relating to at least certain of his claims ... ". R 293.
The state now asks this Court to reject this finding by the District Court. Respondent's
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Briefp. 10, ftnt. 3. In support of its request, the state looks to the Court's analysis of each of the
instances of deficient performance. However, the record speaks for itself The District Court
found deficiencies, and that finding should not be overturned by this Court. See Nevarez v. State,
145 Idaho 878, 880-81, 187 P.3d 1253, 1255-56 (Ct. App. 2006) (On review of summary
dismissal the appellate court liberally construes the facts and reasonable inferences in favor of the
non-moving party).
In response to the state's arguments, six areas of the District Court's analysis will be
discussed.
Urine in the Sink
The District Court found there was no admissible evidence that there was any DNA on
the swabs collected from the bathroom sink. R 285-6. This is true, but is not determinative of
the question of whether a genuine issue of material fact was raised as to deficient performance.
Mr. Newman averred in his affidavit in support of his petition that the urine in the sink
was not his. R 30. This averment was not patently incredible and was sufficient to establish a
genuine issue of material fact. If the swab contained DNA of the man Mr. Newman identified as
the person guilty of the battery, the evidence would have been sufficient to create a reasonable
probability of a different outcome at trial had trial counsel presented the evidence to the jury.
And, even if the sink swab was found to contain no DNA or none of Mr. Newman's DNA, that
result also would have been favorable to Mr. Newman because, if trial counsel had presented a
defense consistent with the facts, Mr. Newman could have testified to the jury that he did not
urinate in the sink and present test results showing that his DNA was not found in the sink,
thereby bolstering his defense. Thus, whether or not DNA was found on the sink swabs, just so
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long as Mr. Newman's DNA was not found, DNA testing would have been beneficial to the
defense and the failure to obtain such testing was deficient performance. Mr. Newman's
allegations were sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether counsel
rendered deficient performance in failing to have the sink swabs tested.
Disclosure of Second Participant/Witness
With regard to the second participant/witness, the District Court held:
... Consequently, there is no way the court could conclude that had the jury been
presented with the unspecified evidence, the outcome of the trial would have been
different. ... To withstand a summary disposition challenge, Newman needed to
have presented a cogent statement of what facts would be testified to relating to
the additional perpetrator, either through his affidavit or through the affidavit of a
person with knowledge. He failed to do so.
R 286-7.
The state argues that this is an "unstated reference to Strickland's 'deficient performance'
requirement." Respondent's Brief p. 16. However, this is not an unstated reference to deficient
performance. The District Court recognized that deficient performance was established by the
failure of trial counsel to present available evidence of a second participant - but found that it
could not conclude the deficiency was prejudicial because it did not have evidence of precisely
what testimony or other evidence could have been presented at trial had counsel not
been deficient. The District Court found an issue of material fact as to the deficiency prong.
Fingernail Clippings and Scrapings
With regard to ineffective assistance of counsel claims relating to failure to obtain DNA
test results on the fingernail clippings and scrapings, again, the state argues that the District Court
implicitly found that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether counsel's
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performance was deficient. However, the District Cou11's order of summary dismissal does not
reach that question, because the Court concluded that "[Mr. Newman] has not raised any genuine
issue of material fact concerning the second prong of Strickland." R 289.
There simply is no finding that there was not a genuine issue of material fact as to
deficient performance.
Failure to Provide Discoverv
The state concedes the District Court did not make a specific finding that Mr. Newman
did not raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether counsel rendered deficient
perfonnance related to discovery. It writes, "Although not expressly stated, the district court's
determination that Newman's claim was conclusory and that he failed to support his claim with
admissible evidence and factual information is tantamount to finding that Newman failed to
demonstrate his trial counsel's perfonnance was deficient." Respondent's Brief at page 20.
Per the state's own admission, the District Court did not find there was not a genuine
issue of material fact as to deficient performance relating to the failure to provide discovery.
Failure to Challenge Admissibility of DNA Trash Bag Evidence
In this instance, the District Court did find no genuine issue of material fact was
presented as to deficient performance: "Petitioner does not set forth facts and argument by which
the court can find that a question of fact exists relating to whether trial counsel's performance
was defective in this regard ... " R 290.
When the District Court intended to make a finding of lack of a genuine issue of material
fact in regard to deficient performance, the Court clearly set out such a finding.

13

Failure to Communicate Concerning Plea Negotiations
Again, the District Court's direct finding here belies the state's argument that the Court
was making implicit findings of a lack of a genuine issue of material fact with regard to deficient
performance in regards to the sink swabs, the disclosure of the second participant, the fingernail
clippings, and the failure to provide discovery. When the Court intended to make a finding of no
genuine issue of material fact with regard to deficient performance, it did so clearly: "The court
does not find that Petitioner has raised a material issue of fact concerning defective perfonnance
relating to failure to secure a plea bargain." R 291.
After arguing that the District Comi implicitly found no genuine issue of material fact
raised as to any instance of deficient perfonnance, despite the District Court's direct statement to
the contrary ("While Newman has raised sufficient issues of fact relating to the first prong of the

Strickland standard ... " R 293), the state asks this Court to hold that cumulative prejudice of
multiple deficiencies should not be considered. Respondent's Brief at page 13, ftnt. 4. However,
the two cases the state cites for this proposition do not endorse ignoring cumulative prejudice
from multiple deficiencies. Villafuerte v. Stewart, 111 F.3d 616 (9 th Cir. 1997), cited by the state
did consider cumulative prejudice: "The combined effect of any deficiencies also did not result in
prejudice." 111 F.3d at 632. And, Cooper v. Fitzharris, supra, also cited by the state in its
footnote, requires a cumulative analysis: "If counsel is charged with multiple errors at trial,
absence of prejudice is not established by demonstrating that no single error considered alone
significantly impaired the defense[;] prejudice may result from the cumulative impact of multiple
deficiencies." 586 F.2d 1325, I 333. This Court should reject the invitation to establish an
unconstitutional precedent whereby ineffective assistance of counsel will be found only where
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one error alone by counsel was sufficient to turn the course of the criminal proceedings - and not
in cases where multiple errors resulted in prejudice.
The District Court found Mr. Newman raised genuine issues of material fact as to
deficient performance. The District Court then erroneously failed to analyze the prejudice of
those individual deficiencies cumulatively. Based upon this error, summary dismissal was
improperly granted in this case.

III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set out in the Opening Brief and above, summary dismissal should not
have been granted in this case. Mr. Newman respectfully requests this Court reverse the order of
dismissal and remand for an evidentiary hearing .

.t{
DATED this~ day of December, 2011.

Deborah Whipple
Attorney for James Ne
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